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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has held that a finding on the defendant's argument for discharge
on double jeopardy grounds is premature, but indicated that the
defendant cannot be retried if the prosecutorial misconduct is
found on remand to have been intentional or in bad faith.
Commonwealth v. Wallace, - Pa. ___, 455 A.2d 1187 (1983).*
On August 20, 1979, William Wallace, Jr. was arrested in Wheel-
ing, West Virginia as a result of a robbery and shooting incident on
August 17, 1979 in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.' Wallace was tried
in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County commencing
on December 3, 1980 on the charges of double homicide, robbery
and criminal conspiracy. Due to the inability of the jury to reach a
verdict, a mistrial resulted.' At the second trial, which began on
February 2, 1981, Wallace was convicted of murder of the first de-
gree, murder of the second degree, robbery and criminal conspir-
acy.4 The jury returned a sentence of death.5 At an evidentiary
hearing, the Honorable John F. Bell denied Wallace's post-verdict
motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence.' Wallace
* Due to the unavailability of the Wallace opinion in the PENNSYLVANIA STATE RE-
PORTS at the time of publication, citations to this reporter have been omitted.
1. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 455 A.2d 1187, 1188 (1983). Wallace was charged with
the deaths of a shop owner and his employee who were found shot in the shop owner's store.
They had been shot with a .32 caliber weapon. Witnesses observed two men (one in a trench
coat, with the general appearance of Wallace) flee from the store carrying handguns and
drive away in a car. The day's receipts of $227.00 had been taken from the cash register.
Wallace was arrested while standing by Henry Brown's car, which matched the description
of the car used in the robbery. There was evidence that Wallace was seen ealier that day
wearing a beige trench coat, carrying a .32 caliber handgun and riding in Brown's car with
Brown. Brown's fingerprint was found on the store's cash register. Id. at 1188-89.
2. Id. at 1188. See Commonwealth v. Wallace, No. 921, slip op. (C.P. Wash. Co. 1979).
3. 455 A.2d at 1188.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1189. Pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) (Purdon 1982), one of
the aggravating circumstances which the jury may consider in the imposition of the death
penalty is that the killing was committed in the perpetration of felony. The Wallace court
noted that when the jury found that the aggravating circumstance that killing was commit-
ted in the perpetration of a felony outweighed any mitigating circumstances, the sentence of
death was mandated by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (Purdon 1982). 455 A.2d at
1188-89.
6. 455 A.2d at 1189.
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was sentenced to death.7 Due to the imposition of the death pen-
alty, the case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania."
The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Larsen.'
Although Wallace did not specifically challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain the convictions, Justice Larsen began by
conducting an independent review of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer.10 The
court held that the evidence adduced at the second trial, consid-
ered with all reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth's favor,"
was sufficient to sustain the convictions.1
2
The court proceeded to address Wallace's contention that the
district attorney failed to (1) disclose the existence and identity of
the Commonwealth's chief witness, Gorby, the witness' criminal re-
cord and the existence of other exculpatory evidence, and (2) cor-
rect false testimony of the witness Gorby.' 3 Relying on Brady v.
7. Id.
8. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 722 (Purdon 1982) (providing that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a court of common pleas
final order imposing a death sentence).
9. 455 A.2d at 1188. Justice Larsen was joined in the majority opinion by Justices
Roberts, Flaherty and Hutchinson; Justice McDermott concurred in the result; Justice Nix
filed a concurring opinion; Chief Justice O'Brien did not participate in the decision. 455
A.2d at 1193.
10. Id. at 1189 (citing Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, - Pa. , n.3, 454
A.2d 937, 942 n.3 (1982)). In Zettlemoyer, the supreme court acknowledged the statutory
obligation imposed on the court by 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h) (Purdon 1982) to
review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a first degree murder conviction even if the
appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. - Pa. at - n.3, 454 A.2d at
942 n.3.
11. See Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976), where the court
held that the test to be applied when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
first degree murder conviction is" '[WIhether, reviewing all of the evidence admitted at trial
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to enable the
trier of fact to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 271, 361
A.2d at 285-86 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bastone, 466 Pa. 548, 552, 353 A.2d 827, 829
(1976)).
12. 455 A.2d at 1189-90. The court considered the evidence introduced at the second
trial including testimony given by the Commonwealth's key witness, Olen Clay Gorby, an
inmate at the Washington County Jail where Wallace was detained after his arrest. The
court identified the most crucial testimony of the prosecution as that of Gorby who testified
that Wallace boasted to him of robbing the store with Brown, shooting the store owner who
lunged at him, and shooting the employee in the store to prevent her from identifying him.
Gorby also testified that Wallace told him he owned a .32 caliber gun, which he had hidden,
and that he was considering killing Brown, whom he considered to be "the only real evi-
dence against him." Id.
13. Id. at 1190. See also Brief for Appellant at 49-60, Commonwealth v. Wallace, 455
A.2d 1187 (1983) (contending that such prosecutorial misconduct warranted Wallace's dis-
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Maryland,' the court held that the district attorney's failure to
correct certain false testimony and to provide defense counsel with
exculpatory evidence deprived Wallace of his right to a fair trial,
and granted a new trial.'5
The court substantiated its finding by quoting the Brady hold-
ing that there is a violation of due process when the prosecutor,
irrespective of his good or bad faith, supresses evidence favorable
to the accused which is material to either guilt or punishment.' 6
The court continued by recognizing the principle that the prosecu-
tor has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory information to
the defense and to correct false testimony of a witness,'17 and fur-
ther, that the prosecutor's office is an entity and, as such, the
knowledge of one member of the office is imputed to all.'8
Justice Larsen indicated that two of the three situations which
constitute a violation of due process under Brady were present in
this case: the prosecution achieved a conviction through the use of
perjured or materially false testimony; and the prosecutor was un-
responsive to requests by the defense for specific exculpatory evi-
dence.' 9 Discussing the first violation, the court said false testi-
charge on the ground of double jeopardy). Justice Larsen addressed the double jeopardy
issue later in the court's opinion. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
14. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady, the United States Supreme Court decided
whether the suppression by the prosecution of an extrajudicial confession of a defendant's
accomplice, notwithstanding a request by the defendant's counsel to review exculpatory
statements, was a denial of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court,
by extending Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), held that the suppression was in
violation of due process. 373 U.S. at 87.
15. 455 A.2d at 1190. The court, citing Commonwealth v. Cohen, 489 Pa. 167, 413 A.2d
1066 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 485 Pa. 542, 403 A.2d 521 (1979), noted that
correctness of the trial court's rulings did not bear on the court's review of the evidence for
sufficiency even though the trial court's rulings concerned constitutional issues. 455 A.2d at
1190 n.2.
16. 455 A.2d at 1190. Justice Larsen wrote: "the suppression by the prosecutor of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is mate-
rial either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or the bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). See 1 A.B.A. STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. 3:36, Standard 3-1.1(c) which Justice Larsen cited as imposing a duty
on the prosecution to seek justice, not merely to convict. 455 A.2d at 1190.
17. See Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 477 Pa. 232, 237, 383 A.2d 909, 911 (1978); PA. R.
CRIM. P. 305D; 1 A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. 3:36, Standard 3-1.1(c).
18. 455 A.2d 1190 (citing Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 477 Pa. 232, 237-38, 383 A.2d
909, 911 (1978) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
19. 455 A.2d at 1190. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The third
situation in which the Brady principle applies, but which is inapplicable to this case, is
when the defense makes no special request for exculpatory evidence but the prosecutor
knows, or has reason to believe, that he had evidence tending to exculpate a defendant. 455
A.2d at 1190 n.3. See also infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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mony is found material, resulting in the necessity for a new trial, if
the false testimony could affect the judgment of the jury "in any
reasonable likelihood." 0 The court found that testimony which the
district attorney knew or should have known was false, was elicited
and allowed to stand uncorrected by the district attorney.21 In so
doing, the court identified testimony rendered by the Common-
wealth's chief witness, Olen Clay Gorby, and found that the prose-
cution failed to correct Gorby's statements when he falsely testi-
fied at the second trial that: he had been in prison since his arrest
in November of 1979;22 he had pleaded guilty to everything he had
ever done;23 he had not fired any shots during a previous incident
for which he had been arrested;24 and a plea bargaining recommen-
dation of five to ten years imprisonment had been made on charges
stemming from a prior arrest.25 The court concluded that Gorby's
reliability as a witness could be determinative of the jury's finding
Wallace guilty or innocent and thus disclosure of evidence affect-
ing Gorby's credibility was found to fall within the rule of Brady2
The court also found that specific requests by defense counsel, in
both the first and second trials, were repeatedly ignored by the dis-
trict attorney's office, constituting a violation of the second Brady
situation. 7 The court noted that in the first trial defense counsel
attempted to discover if a "jailhouse confession" had been made
20. 455 A.2d at 1190, 1191. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (quoting
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)).
21. 455 A.2d at 1191.
22. Id. In fact, the court found that Gorby had been released for a three month period
in 1980 to work as an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms. Id.
23. Id. The court also found that while Gorby was released for work as an undercover
agent, he was arrested and charged with eleven counts of burglary to which he did not plead
guilty until after Wallace's trial. Id.
24. Id. Gorby was arrested in November of 1979 on numerous charges stemming from
an incident at a golf course in Washington County. The court found that, contrary to his
testimony at the second trial, Gorby had discharged a gun at least twice during the incident.
Id.
25. Id. Gorby, in actuality, received only a ten year probation on the charges. Id.
26. 455 A.2d at 1190, 1191. In so holding, the court cited as precedent Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), and
Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 153, 369 A.2d 1234, 1240 (1977)).
27. 455 A.2d at 1192. In the second Brady situation, the prosecutor fails to respond to
requests by defense counsel for specific exculpatory evidence. The court recognized the fol-
lowing principle set forth in United States v. Agurs: If the subject of defense counsel's re-
quest is material (or there is a substantial basis for materiality), it is reasonable to require
the prosecutor to either submit the issue to the trial judge for determination or to provide it
to the defense. 455 A.2d at 1192. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
552 Vol. 22:549
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by Wallace.2 8 However, in response, the Commonwealth ignored
the request, rather than challenge the appellant's right to discover
the requested information and have the trial court make the deter-
mination.29 The court also noted defense counsel's request for dis-
covery regarding the criminal records of witnesses, 30 and found
that the district attorney's office failed to reveal eleven burglary
charges pending against the witness Gorby.3 ' The court held that
the district attorney's unilateral determination that the pending
burglary charges were not discoverable was a violation of Brady
principles since the defendant was entitled to know of any criminal
charges pending against the government witness bearing upon his
possible motivation for testifying and, therefore, his veracity.
32
When confronted with the issue of whether the misrepresenta-
tion and nondisclosure by the district attorney constituted grounds
for discharge by reason of double jeopardy, Justice Larsen held
that such a remedy would be drastic and premature and that the
award of a new trial was sufficient.33 However, he further held that
the granting of a new trial was without prejudice to Wallace's right
to petition the lower court for discharge on double jeopardy
grounds prior to reprosecution.s4 The court found that although
the lower court had determined that the prosecutor had not inten-
tionally misled the court and the jury, no such finding had been
made with regard to the motivation of the district attorney's office
at the first pre-trial and trial.38 Justice Larsen ruled that the lower
court had erred in not addressing the issue of prosecutorial mis-
conduct at the first trial, noting that the issue was not rendered
moot by a declaration of mistrial due to a hung jury.' He stated
that a ruling that the prosecutorial misconduct at the first trial did
not prejudice the defense might be valid if the district attorney's
representations were found simply to be mistaken and not inten-
28. 455 A.2d at 1192. Requests for discovery were made by the defense pursuant to PA.
R. CRIM. P. 305, as well as requests at oral argument on the discovery motion. 455 A.2d at
1192.
29. 455 A.2d at 1192. The court noted that PA. R. CaM. P. 305A requires that the
prosecution challenge the defense's right to discover the requested information, rather than
ignore it. 455 A.2d at 1192.
30. 455 A.2d at 1192.
31. Id.
32. Id.






tional or in bad faith. 1 However, if the representations were found
to be intentional or in bad faith, "the taint of 'prosecutorial over-
reaching' would not have been dissipated by subsequent
prosecution. "38
Justice Larsen based his conclusion on the fact that the exis-
tence of the prosecutor's chief witness, Gorby, was not revealed to
defense counsel at the first trial despite specific requests for jail-
house confessions, and that the district attorney informed the
court at the first trial that his office first became aware of Gorby
"probably a month ago."39 Because there was evidence that the
district attorney had met with Gorby and had had his statement
transcribed five months prior to the first trial, the court questioned
the truthfulness of the district attorney's representation. 0
In a concurring opinion,' Justice Nix indicated that he would
grant Wallace a new trial but preclude him from petitioning the
lower court for discharge on double jeopardy grounds.' 2 In so hold-
ing, Justice Nix reasserted his objection to the scope of protection
under double jeopardy provided by the majority. 3 The Justice fur-
ther cited Oregon v. Kennedy"4  as overruling the federal
"prosecutorial overreaching" standard of double jeopardy for bar-
ring retrial which was relied upon by the majority.'
6
Two significant issues were therefore raised in Wallace. First,
was Wallace deprived of a fair trial by the district attorney's fail-
ure to correct false testimony and to provide the defendant with





41. 455 A.2d at 1193-94 (Nix, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Id. Justice Nix has repeatedly expressed the opinion that prosecutorial misconduct
is generally a violation of due process and not jeopardy; double jeopardy only becomes an
issue where the prosecutorial misconduct prevents the jury from reaching a verdict. See
Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 494 Pa. 600, 601, 432 A.2d 149, 150-51 (1981) (Nix, J., Opinion
in Support of Affirmance); Commonwealth v. Lee, 490 Pa. 346, 350-51, 416 A.2d 503, 505-06
(1980) (Nix, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Starks, 490 Pa. 336, 344, 416 A.2d 498, 502
(1980) (Nix, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 287, 386 A.2d 918, 936
(1978) (Nix, J., Opinion in Support of Reversal).
44. 456 U.S. 667 (1982). See infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Kennedy.
45. 455 A.2d at 1194 (Nix, J., concurring). The justice noted that the overruled
"prosecutorial overreaching" standard was an "exception to the 'manifest necessity excep-
tion' to the general rule that when a mistrial is declared over the defendant's objection,
retrial is barred." Id.
554 Vol. 22:549
1984 Recent Decisions 555
nondisclosure by the district attorney necessitate Wallace's dis-
charge on double jeopardy grounds?
With regard to the first issue, the United States Supreme Court
has identified three types of situations in which a prosecutor may
violate due process by suppressing evidence favorable to an ac-
cused which is known during trial by the prosecutor but not the
defense." When the case involves either (1) perjured testimony, or
(2) a request by the defense for specific evidence which is withheld
by the prosecution, there is a violation of due process requiring a
new trial if the perjured testimony might have affected the jury's
judgment or the suppressed evidence might have affected the
trial's outcome. 7 In the third type of situation, where the defense
makes no specific request for exculpatory information, 4 a higher
standard of materiality is applied:' 9 nondisclosure of the evidence
by the prosecution is a violation of due process only "if the omit-
ted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist."
50
The court's holding that Wallace was deprived of a fair trial by
the prosecutor's failure to correct the false testimony of the Com-
monwealth's witness and suppression of specifically requested ex-
culpatory evidence is in accordance with the principles set forth in
46. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). See generally Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (holding that due process was denied the defendant when the
state secured a conviction through testimony it knew to be perjured); Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959) (extending Mooney to a situation in which the state did not solicit the false
evidence, but allowed it to stand uncorrected); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (fur-
ther extending Mooney to include the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused in situations in which the defense has made a specific request for the evidence).
47. 427 U.S. at 103-04. The strict standard of materiality set forth by the Agurs court
had its origins in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and Giglio v. United States, 450 U.S. 150 (1972). In Napue, the Court determined
there was a violation of due process when the prosecutor allowed known false evidence,
which related only to the credibility of the witness, to stand uncorrected because the false
evidence could have affected the jury's judgment in determining guilt or innocence. Napue,
360 U.S. at 269. In Brady, the Court said that the suppression of evidence by the prosecutor
which is "material to either guilt or punishment" is a violation of due process. Brady, 373
U.S. at 104. In Giglio, the Court applied the rationale of Napue to the Brady standard and
found testimony that might have affected the judgment of the jury in "any reasonable likeli-
hood" to be material, and thus a violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial. Giglio, 405
U.S. at 154.
48. When the defense makes either no request for exculpatory information or a very
broad request, such as "all Brady material," his actions constitute the third type of Brady
situation. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 112. See also, Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1982) (interpreting the drawing
back of the Agurs Court as a reflection of the Court's valuation of the adversarial system).
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Brady v. Maryland5 1 and its progeny.52  Since Wallace involved
perjured testimony and specific requests for exculpatory evidence,
the court correctly applied the standards of materiality set forth in
Giglio v. United States53 and United States v. Agurs:4 Wallace
was deprived of a fair trial in violation of due process because
there was a reasonable likelihood that the nondisclosed exculpa-
tory evidence and the jury's impression of the reliability of the wit-
ness could have affected the jury's judgment.
55
With regard to the double jeopardy issue, the Wallace majority
held that if the prosecutorial misconduct" at the first pretrial and
trial were found to have been intentional or in bad faith, the
prosecutorial overreaching would not have been cured by the sub-
sequent prosecution, and Wallace would then be entitled to
51. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
52. E.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97 (1976); Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has acted consistently with the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court regarding prosecutorial overreaching. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hallo-
well, 477 Pa. 232, 383 A.2d 909 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 472 Pa. 467, 383 A.2d 195
(1978); Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 472 Pa. 510, 372 A.2d 801 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977). In Hallowell, the defense alleged that the prosecu-
tion permitted a witness to testify falsely without correction. The court cited the affirmative
duty of a prosecuting attorney to correct testimony of a witness which he knows to be false,
as set forth in Napue, and cited standards set forth in Brady, Mooney and Giglio. The
Hallowell court held that failure of the prosecution to correct testimony by the witness
which the prosecution knew to be false even though the trial prosecutor may not have been
aware of the false testimony was cause for reversal and the granting of a new trial. Hallo-
well, 477 Pa. 232, 383 A.2d 909. In Jenkins, the defense made a specific request for evidence
regarding any statements made by the defendant and contained in reports of the Common-
wealth, and the prosecution failed to disclose such statements. The court held that the with-
holding of the statement by the prosecution was reversible error, applying the strict stan-
dard of materiality to the Brady situation of a specific request by defense, as set forth in
Agurs. Jenkins, 472 Pa. 467, 383 A.2d 195. In Carpenter, also, the accused argued that the
witness testified falsely with the prosecutor's knowledge. The court acknowledged that a
conviction obtained by false testimony must be overturned and that the prosecution has an
affirmative duty to correct false testimony in accordance with Giglio, but found no evidence
that the witness' testimony was false. Carpenter, 472 Pa. 510, 372 A.2d 801. In Cain, the
accused argued that the witness testified falsely with the prosecutor's knowledge. The court
acknowledged that the prosecution may not suppress evidence which is exculpatory, but
found that there was no evidence that the witness' testimony was false. Cain, 471 Pa. 140,
369 A.2d 1234.
53. 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
54. 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
55. See id. at 103.
56. 455 A.2d at 1193. Justice Larsen identified the prosecutorial misconduct in ques-
tion as testimony by the district attorney at the first trial regarding when his office first
became aware of the existence and identity of the witness Gorby. Although the district at-
torney testified it probably had been a month prior to trial, he had actually spoken to Gorby
approximately five months before trial. Id.
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discharge.57
Regarding this issue, the United States Supreme Court has set
forth the general rule that prosecutorial misconduct does not give
rise to protection against reprosecution where the defendant wins a
reversal on appeal.58 The Court has developed a line of exceptions
to be applied when the original proceeding has terminated prema-
turely through mistrial.
In United States v. Perez,59 the Court enunciated the principle
to be applied in cases in which a mistrial is declared by the judge
sua sponte. If the judge finds a manifest necessity to declare a mis-
trial, retrial is not barred.60 In 1975, the United States Supreme
Court was confronted with the landmark case of United States v.
Dinitz,6' dealing with a mistrial which had been declared at the
defendant's request.62 In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court
found that different policy considerations inhere when a mistrial is
declared at the defendant's request than when it is declared by a
judge sua sponte.6" The Dinitz Court held that the judicial over-
reaching was not a bar to retrial since the judge's actions were not
a bad faith attempt to cause the defendant to move for a mistrial
or to "prejudice his prospect for an acquittal."" The Dinitz Court
stated the principle that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial
where the judge or prosecutor, in bad faith, threatens harassment
of the defendant by successive prosecutions or declarations of mis-
trial, thereby affording the prosecution a better opportunity to
convict the defendant.
65
In the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronounce-
57. Id. Thus, the new trial was granted by the Wallace court without prejudice to
Wallace's right to petition the lower court for discharge on grounds that the prosecutorial
overreaching at the first pretrial and trial was in bad faith or intentional, raising a bar to
retrial. Id.
58. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
59. 9 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
60. Id. at 580. Following the Perez standard in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470
(1971), the Court found reprosecution to be barred where the trial judge did not assure that
there was a manifest necessity for his declaration of a mistrial. Id. at 487.
61. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
62. Id. at 604.
63. Id. at 608 (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971), for the rationale
that a defendant retains control over whether to request mistrial or go to the jury when the
mistrial is at his request).
64. In Dinitz, Justice Stewart cited United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, for the
proposition that the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant against bad faith conduct
by a judge or prosecutor. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611.
65. 424 U.S. at 611.
1984
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ment, Oregon v. Kennedy,66 the defendant, who had been granted
a mistrial at his request, argued that his retrial should be barred
due to prosecutorial overreaching. 7 Citing "Dinitz6 s as authority,
the Oregon Court of Appeals held that when a mistrial has been
granted at the defendant's request, retrial is barred if the
prosecutorial error that prompted the defendant's mistrial request
was intended to provoke a mistrial, or "motivated by bad faith or
undertaken to harass or prejudice" the defendant.6 9 The court of
appeals accepted the finding of the trial court that the prosecution
had not intended to cause a mistrial, but barred retrial due to a
finding of prosecutorial overreaching. 70 In a plurality opinion ren-
dered by Justice Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed.7 1 The Court held that following a mistrial on the defen-
dant's own motion, reprosecution is precluded by the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution only if the prosecution intended to provoke the defendant
to move for a mistrial.7 2 The Court thus refuted the general over-
reaching standard as a bar to retrial. Although the Court acknowl-
edged that the language in Dinitz apparently recognized that re-
trial is barred by prosecutorial bad faith conduct or harassment,73
it indicated that the general bad faith or harassment standard
would be difficult to apply since it offered no standards for
application.
7 4
The majority also refuted the defendant's argument that the
court of appeals had based its decision on the independent ground
of the law of the State of Oregon, noting that the cases on which
the court of appeals had relied were decided on federal grounds by
the United States Supreme Court. 75 A concurring opinion by Jus-
66. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
67. Id. at 670.
68. 424 U.S. at 611.
69. 49 Or. App. 415, 417-18, 619 P.2d 948, 949 (1980).
70. Id. at 419, 619 P.2d at 950.
71. 456 U.S. 667, 669 (1982), rev'g 49 Or. App. 415, 619 P.2d 948 (1980). Justice Rehn-
quist was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, O'Connor and Powell. Concur-
ring opinions were filed by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 456 U.S. at 680; Justice Powell,
id. at 679; and Justice Stevens who was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Black-
mun, id. at 681.
72. Id. at 676.
73. Id. at 678. See also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 n.12 (1971) (citing
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 n.3 (1964) for the proposition that reprosecution
might be barred where prosecutorial or judicial misconduct designed to avoid an acquittal
causes the defendant to move for a mistrial).
74. 456 U.S. at 676.
75. Id. at 671. The Court further noted this would be acceptable even if "the case
Vol. 22:549
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tices Brennan and Marshall emphasized, however, that the Court's
decision would not preclude the state courts, on remand, from
finding that retrial would violate the double jeopardy provisions of
the Oregon Constitution.76
In a concurring opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, 77 it was ar-
gued that a defendant's successful motion for a mistrial should re-
move the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution unless the mistrial
was caused by prosecutorial overreaching or harassment or intent
to cause mistrial.78 Thus, the concurring Justices would have recog-
nized a general overreaching standard under federal law.7 9 The
concurrence criticized the rationale of Justice Rehnquist, stating
that although a prosecutor may intend to provoke a mistrial, it is
almost "inconceivable" that a defendant could prove the prosecu-
tor was so motivated.
8 0
Kennedy also touched on the issue of whether double jeopardy
principles apply when there is an appellate reversal of a denial of a
defendant's motion for mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct. In
his discussion, Justice Rehnquist noted that trial judges might
tend to deny a defendant's mistrial motion and let the error be
corrected on appeal where double jeopardy would not bar retrial.8
He reasoned that retrial would not be barred because the interests
protected by double jeopardy would be satisfied by the trial culmi-
nating in a verdict.8 2 In criticizing Justice Rehnquist's assumption,
Justice Stevens identified the interest protected by the culmina-
tion of trial in a verdict as the defendant's retention of control over
the course to be followed during trial. He noted that when a defen-
dant is forced to choose between continuing in a tainted trial or
provoking a mistrial, he has lost all control; his double jeopardy
interests are no longer protected by the trial ending with a ver-
admitted of more doubt as to whether federal and state grounds for the decision were inter-
mixed." Id.
76. Id. at 681-82 (Brennan, J., concurring). Note that the concurrence filed by Justice
Stevens, and joined by Justice Blackmun as well as Justices Marshall and Brennan, also
stated that the Oregon Supreme Court may interpret the double jeopardy provisions of the
Oregon Constitution as providing broader protection than the federal provision. Id. at 681
n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 681 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was joined in his concurrence
by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun.
78. Id. at 683 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 684 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 688 (Stevens, J., concurring).




dict.83 Justice Stevens, therefore, characterized the assumption of
the Court as "irrational."84
After Kennedy, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was free to
interpret the Pennsylvania Constitution as providing a broader
standard of protection against double jeopardy than does the
United States Constitution." However, the Wallace majority did
not indicate that it was basing its analysis on independent state
grounds.8 6 Rather, Justice Larsen cited Commonwealth v. Starks 7
and United States v. Dinitz88 as authority for defendant's request
that he be discharged on double jeopardy grounds, finding that if
the prosecution made an intentional bad faith attempt to mislead
the jury at the first pretrial and trial, retrial would be precluded. 9
The Starks opinion cited by the court relied on the federal consti-
tutional standard of Dinitz, and held that prosecutorial conduct in
bad faith, designed to prejudice or harass the defendant, bars re-
trial of the defendant.90 Along with Starks, the Pennsylvania cases
regarding double jeopardy due to prosecutorial overreaching have
historically been guided by the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting the fifth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution." This pattern was continued in Wallace with the major-
ity's citation of Dinitz.9 2 However, as noted by Justice Nix
concurring in Wallace,95 the federal constitutional standard that
retrial is barred by the intentional, bad faith conduct of the prose-
83. Id. at 685-86 (Stevens, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 687 n.22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. See 456 U.S. at 671, 680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring), 681 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. Cf. 455 A.2d at 1194 (Justice Nix' concurring opinion indicating that Kennedy
overruled the federal constitutional standard regarding overreaching, and that there is no
"such standard under state law"). Id.
87. 490 Pa. 336, 416 A.2d 498 (1980).
88. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
89. See Wallace, 455 A.2d at 1193.
90. Starks, 490 Pa. at 339-41, 416 A.2d at 499-501.
91. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 260-67, 386 A.2d 918, 922-26
(1978) (deciding whether retrial of defendant was barred by the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 482 Pa. 333, 342, 393 A.2d 1133,
1138 (1978) (following the Dinitz standards, and finding no basis for providing greater pro-
tection under the double jeopardy provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution than the fed-
eral constitution); Commonwealth v. Starks, 490 Pa. 336, 339-40, 416 A.2d 498, 499-500 (dis-
cussing both state and federal constitutions, but basing its analysis on decisions following
United States Supreme Court decisions); Commonwealth v. Virtu, 495 Pa. 49, 65 n.7, 432
A.2d 198, 201 n.7 (1981) (relying on the standards set forth in Dinitz as recognized by
Starks).
92. 455 A.2d at 1193 (citing Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600).
93. 455 A.2d at 1194 (Nix, J., concurring).
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cution" was disavowed by Kennedy."5 From the United States Su-
preme Court's finding in Kennedy, it can be concluded that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania must clearly rest its interpretation
on the double jeopardy provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion in order to continue to bar retrial of a defendant due to inten-
tional, bad faith conduct of the prosecution."6
However, even assuming the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
not adequately rested its double jeopardy decision on state
grounds, an argument could be made that the facts are distinguish-
able from Kennedy. In Wallace, a mistrial of the first trial was
declared by the judge sua sponte,7 and the second trial termi-
nated in a conviction.9" The trial court denied the defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence of
prosecutorial overreaching and the appellate court reversed the de-
nial of the motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evi-
dence. Wallace, therefore, raises the question of whether the prin-
ciples barring retrial under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment 9 as applied by the United States Supreme Court
when a mistrial has resulted due to prosecutorial misconduct
should be applied when trial has culminated in a jury verdict
which has been set aside on appeal due to after-discovered evi-
dence of prosecutorial overreaching.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet directly
confronted this issue, it has been discussed by several United
States circuit courts. In United States v. Curtis,100 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the Kennedy principle enun-
ciated two months earlier by the United States Supreme Court to
an appellate reversal of conviction due to prosecutorial miscon-
94. See Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600. See also Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
95. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982). However, the statement by Justice
Nix that the prosecutorial overreaching standard had been an exception to the manifest
necessity exception to the general rule is incorrect. Compare Wallace, 455 A.2d 1187, 1194
(Nix, J., concurring) with Kennedy, 456 U.S. 672-73. See supra notes 59-65 and accompany-
ing text. The prosecutorial overreaching standard was suggested in Dinitz as an exception to
the general rule that double jeopardy is not a bar to retrial when a mistrial is declared at the
request of defendant. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607. The manifest necessity standard applies
when a mistrial is declared sua sponte by the judge; retrial is barred unless the judge finds a
manifest necessity for declaring the mistrial. Id.
96. See 456 U.S. at 671. See also supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
97. 455 A.2d at 1188. The mistrial was declared because the jury was unable to reach a
verdict, not because of prosecutorial overreaching. Id.
98. Id.
99. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applies to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
100. 683 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 379 (1982).
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duct. ' The court reasoned that a defendant should not be given
less constitutional protection because the court failed to recognize
the impropriety of the prosecutor's actions until the case was on
appeal.1 0 2 Finding there was no prosecutorial intent to abort the
trial, the court held that the prosecutorial misconduct would not
bar retrial under the Kennedy test even if retrial could be barred
following appellate reversal for prosecutorial misconduct.'03 In
United States v. Singleterry,10 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit also discussed, and avoided deciding, this issue.'0 5 Although
noting the anomaly in barring retrial in the case of a mistrial but
not in the case of appellate reversal, the court reasoned that when
mistrial is not declared, any prosecutorial intent to abort the trial
has been thwarted, thus avoiding the danger being prevented
under Kennedy.06 The Fifth and Third Circuits both noted the
apparent assumption of the plurality in Kennedy that when a con-
viction is reversed on appeal for a prosecutorial misconduct,
double jeopardy is not a bar to retrial.'0 7 The courts further noted
Justice Stevens' concurrence criticizing that assumption.' 8
One month later, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dealt
with this issue more extensively in Robinson v. Wade.09 The court
began by expressing some doubt whether the Kennedy limitation
on the circumstances in which prosecutorial overreaching may bar
retrial applies to cases which terminate in conviction rather than
mistrial."0 But citing the dissension in the Kennedy plurality"'
and concurring' 2 opinions concerning whether retrial should be
barred when the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion for mis-
trial has been overturned on appeal, the court noted the United
101. Curtis, 683 F.2d at 776-78.
102. Id. at 774. In Curtis, the defendant's attorney had moved for a mistrial and the
motion had been denied by the trial judge. Id. at 771.
103. Id. at 776. The court carefully noted that it did not decide whether retrial could
be barred following an appellate reversal for prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 778.
104. 683 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 387 (1982).
105. Id. at 123-24.
106. Id. at 124 (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673).
107. United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d at 774-75; United States v. Singleterry, 683 F.2d
at 124 (both citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676).
108. United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d at 775; United States v. Singleterry, 683 F.2d at
124 (both citing Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 687
n.22). See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
109. 686 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 305.
111. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 n.7. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying
text.
112. Id. at 687 n.22. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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States Supreme Court's strong criticism of the policy of hinging
application of the double jeopardy clause on whether the
prosecutorial misconduct was found improper by the trial court or
the appellate court.113 Although the court recognized Justice Ste-
vens' rationale in Kennedy that the double jeopardy clause is of-
fended by prosecutional overreaching designed to avoid acquit-
tal,' 14 the court of appeals applied the Kennedy plurality standard
barring retrial only if the prosecutorial misconduct was intended to
"provoke a motion for a mistrial."'"15
The Wallace majority did not directly confront the issue of
whether the Kennedy limitation" 6 should apply when a jury ver-
dict has been set aside on appeal due to after-discovered evidence
of prosecutorial overreaching. If Kennedy is applicable to cases in
which the appellate court reverses the trial court's denial of a de-
fendant's motion for new trial based on after-discovered evidence
-of prosecutorial overreaching, retrial is not barred unless the
prosecutorial misconduct was prompted by an intent to cause a
mistrial. 17 As indicated in the decisions by the United States
Courts of Appeals" 8 and the dissension between the majority and
the concurring opinions in Kennedy,"9 it is not clear whether the
United States Supreme Court would apply the principles barring
retrial when a mistrial has resulted, to situations of appellate
reversal.
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has addressed the
issue in cases in which the defendant's motion for mistrial due to
prosecutorial misconduct was denied and the appellate court re-
versed. 20 In Commonwealth v. Potter,'2' the court held that a case
in which a new trial was granted at the defendant's request should
113. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d at 306-07 (distinguishing United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82 (1978) and Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)).
114. 686 F.2d at 307-08 (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 689).
115. 686 F.2d at 308.
116. The plurality in Kennedy stated that a defendant may not be retried when the
prosecutorial "conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to
provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial." Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679 (emphasis
added).
117. Id. at 676.
118. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Curtis,
683 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Singleterry, 683 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1982).
119. 456 U.S. at 676, 687 n.22.
120. E.g. Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 494 Pa. 600, 432 A.2d 149 (1981); Commonwealth
v. Starks, 490 Pa. 336, 416 A.2d 498 (1980); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 482 Pa. 333, 393 A.2d
1133 (1978); Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 386 A.2d 918 (1978).
121. 478 Pa. 251, 386 A.2d 918 (1978).
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not be distinguished from one in which mistrial was granted by an
appellate court for double jeopardy purposes. 22 The court cited re-
cent cases in the United States Supreme Court 2 s for the proposi-
tion that the applicability of double jeopardy should not turn on
"nice procedural distinctions.1 24 The Potter court further noted
that if a different standard were applied to reprosecution of a ver-
dict set aside on appeal than were applied where a mistrial was
granted at trial, mistrial motions might be denied even though
legitimate.1
25
In Wallace, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied for the
first time discharge principles applicable to cases of mistrial due to
prosecutorial overreaching to a case in which the defendant did not
move for a mistrial due to prosecutorial overreaching, but rather
moved for a new trial after the verdict was rendered due to after-
discovered evidence of prosecutorial overreaching. Although dicta
in Kennedy suggests otherwise, 2 6 this interpretation by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania may be justified. As Justice Stevens
noted in his concurring opinion in Kennedy,127 the rationale for
barring retrial when a mistrial has been granted on request of de-
fendant seems equally applicable when trial has been terminated
other than by the mistrial request of a defendant. The same ra-
tionale may apply when trial has resulted in a verdict but the ap-
pellate court reverses the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
for new trial due to after-discovered evidence. Although the defen-
dant had his opportunity to receive a verdict, he retained no con-
trol over the course of trial.'28 Rather than being faced with a Hob-
son's choice, he had no choice at all; the double jeopardy interest
satisfied by the rendering of a verdict'2 9 was defeated.
Even if the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Wallace is correct
in applying the mistrial discharge principles to a case reversed on
appeal, the majority should acknowledge that the United States
122. Id. at 254, 386 A.2d at 919.
123. Id. at 253, 386 A.2d at 918 (citing Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977);
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); United States v. Jenkins,
420 U.S. 358 (1975)). But see Commonwealth v. Hogan, 482 Pa. 333, 393 A.2d 1133 (1978)
(where Justice Nix wrote that double jeopardy does not prohibit retrial).
124. 478 Pa. at 256, 386 A.2d at 921.
125. Id. (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)).
126. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676.
127. Id. at 685-86 (Stevens, J., concurring).




Supreme Court's recent decision, Oregon v. Kennedy,130 limits the
federal double jeopardy bar to cases in which the prosecutor acted
with an intent to cause a mistrial. Unless the alignment of the plu-
rality in Oregon v. Kennedy should change, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania must either distinguish Kennedy or ground its opin-
ion on the Pennsylvania Constitution in order to hold that retrial
of the defendant is barred by double jeopardy where the defendant
has been granted a new trial due to after-discovered evidence of
intentional misconduct or bad faith representations by the
prosecution.
Pamela K. Wiles
130. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 667.
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